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Abstract
The cipher block chaining (CBC) block cipher mode of operation was
invented by IBM (International Business Machine) in 1976. It presents a
very popular way of encrypting which is used in various applications. In
this paper, we have mathematically proven that, under some conditions,
the CBC mode of operation can admit a chaotic behaviour according to
Devaney. Some cases will be properly studied in order to put in evidence
this idea.
1 Introduction
Block ciphers have a very simple principle. They do not treat the original text
bit by bit but they manipulate blocks of text – for example, a block of 64 bits
for the DES (Data Encryption Standard) or a block of 128 bits for the AES
(Advanced Encryption Standard) algorithm. In fact, the original text is broken
into blocks of N bits. For each block, the encryption algorithm is applied to
obtain an encrypted block which has the same size. Then we gather all blocks,
which are encrypted separately, to obtain the complete encrypted message. For
decryption, we precede in the same way but this time starting from the cipher
text to obtain the original message using the decryption algorithm instead of
the encryption function. So, it is not sufficient to put anyhow a block cipher
algorithm in a program. We can instead use these algorithms in various ways
according to their specific needs. These ways are called the block cipher modes
of operation. There are several modes of operation and each mode has owns
characteristics and its specific security properties. In this paper, we will consider
only one of these modes which is the cipher block chaining (CBC) one, and we
will study it according to chaos.
The chaos theory we consider in this article is the Devaney’s topological
one [8].In addition to being recognized as one of the best mathematical definition
of chaos, this theory offers a framework with qualitative and quantitative tools to
evaluate the notion of unpredictability [5]. As an application of our fundamental
results, we are interested in the area of information safety and security. The
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goal of this paper is to study the conditions under which the CBC mode of
operation can admit a Devaney’s chaotic behavior.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we will
recall some basic definitions concerning chaos and cipher-block chaining mode
of operation. Section 3 is devoted to the proofs of chaotic behaviour for the
CBC mode. Some cases will be studied in Section 4 while results are discussed
in the next section. This research work ends by a conclusion section, in which
contributions are recalled and some intended future work are proposed.
2 Basic recalls
This section is devoted to basic definitions and terminologies in the field of
topological chaos and in the one of block cipher mode of operation.
2.1 Devaney’s Chaotic Dynamical Systems
In the remainder of this article, Sn denotes the nth term of a sequence S while
XN is the set of all sequences whose elements belong to X . Vi stands for the ith
component of a vector V . fk = f◦...◦f is for the kth composition of a function f .
N is the set of natural (non-negative) numbers, while N∗ stands for the positive
integers 1, 2, 3, . . . Finally, the following notation is used: J1;NK = {1, 2, . . . , N}.
Consider a topological space (X , τ) and a continuous function f : X → X
on (X , τ).
Definition 1 The function f is topologically transitive if, for any pair of open
sets U, V ⊂ X , there exists an integer k > 0 such that fk(U) ∩ V 6= ∅.
Definition 2 An element x is a periodic point for f of period n ∈ N, n > 1, if
fn(x) = x and fk(x) 6= x, 1 ≤ k ≤ n. f is regular on (X , τ) if the set of periodic
points for f is dense in X : for any point x in X , any neighborhood of x contains
at least one periodic point.
Definition 3 The function f has sensitive dependence on initial conditions if
there exists δ > 0 such that, for any x ∈ X and any neighborhood V of x, there
exist y ∈ V and n > 0 such that
d (fn(x), fn(y)) > δ.
δ is called the constant of sensitivity of f .
Definition 4 (Devaney’s formulation of chaos [7]) The function f is chaotic
on a metric space (X , d) if f is regular, topologically transitive, and has sensitive
dependence on initial conditions.
Banks et al. have proven in [6] that when f is regular and transitive on a
metric space (X , d), then f has the property of sensitive dependence on initial
conditions. This is why chaos can be formulated too in a topological space
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(X , τ): in that situation, chaos is obtained when f is regular and topologically
transitive. Note that the transitivity property is often obtained as a consequence
of the strong transitivity one, which is defined below.
Definition 5 f is strongly transitive on (X , d) if, for all point x, y ∈ X and for
all neighborhood V of x, it exists n ∈ N and x′ ∈ V such that fn(x′) = y.
2.2 CBC properties
Like some other modes of operation, the CBC mode requires not only a plaintext
but also an initialization vector (IV) as input. In what follows, we will show
how this mode of operation works in practice.
2.2.1 Initialisation vector IV
As what have been already announced, in addition to the plaintext the CBC
mode of operation requires an initialization vector in order to randomize the
encryption. This vector is used to produce distinct ciphertexts even if the same
plaintext is encrypted multiple times, without the need of a slower re-keying
process [11].
An initialization vector must be generated for each execution of the encryp-
tion operation, and the same vector is necessary for the corresponding execution
of the decryption operation, see Figure 1. Therefore the IV, or information that
is sufficient to calculate it, must be available to each party of any commu-
nication. The initialization vector does not need to be secret, so the IV, or
information sufficient to determine the IV, may be transmitted with the cipher
text. In addition, the initialization vector must be unpredictable: for any given
plaintext, it must not be possible to predict the IV that will be associated to
the plaintext, in advance to the vector generation [9].
There are two recommended methods for generating unpredictable IVs. The
first method is to apply the forward cipher function, under the same key that is
used for the encryption of the plaintext, to a nonce. The nonce must be a data
block that is unique to each execution of the encryption operation. For example,
the nonce may be a counter or a message number. The second method is to
generate a random data block using a FIPS (Federal Information Processing
Standard)-approved random number generator [9, 1].
2.2.2 Padding process
A block cipher works on units of a fixed size (known as a block size), but mes-
sages come in variety of lengths. So some modes, namely the ECB (Electronic
Codebook) and CBC ones, require that the final block is padded before encryp-
tion. In other words, the total number of bits in the plaintext must be a positive
multiple of the block size N.
If the data string to be encrypted does not initially satisfy this property,
then the formatting of the plaintext must entail an increase in the number of
bits. A common way to achieve the necessary increase is to append some extra
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bits, called padding, to the trailing end of the data string as the last step in the
formatting of the plaintext. An example of a padding method is to append a
single 1 bit to the data string and then to pad the resulting string by as few 0
bits, possibly none, as are necessary to complete the final block (other methods
may be used).
For the above padding method, the padding bits can be removed unambigu-
ously provided the receiver can determine that the message is indeed padded.
One way to ensure that the receiver does not mistakenly remove bits from an
unpadded message is to require the sender to pad every message, including mes-
sages in which the final block is already complete. For such messages, an entire
block of padding is appended. Alternatively, such messages can be sent without
padding if, for each message, the existence of padding can be reliably inferred,
e.g., from a message length indicator [9].
2.2.3 CBC mode characteristics
Cipher block chaining is a block cipher mode that provides confidentiality but
not message integrity in cryptography. The CBC mode offers a solution to the
greatest part of the problems presented by the ECB (Electronic codebook) for
example [13], because thanks to CBC mode the encryption will depends on the
context. Indeed, the cipher text of each block encrypted by a keyed encryption
function εk, where k is the secret key, will depend not only on the initialization
vector IV, but also on the plaintext of all preceding blocks. Specifically, the
binary operator XOR is applied between the current bloc of the plaintext and
the previous block of the cipher text, as depicted in Figure 1. Then, we apply
the encryption function to the result of this operation. For the first block, the
initialization vector takes place of the previous cipher text block.
CBC mode has several advantages. In fact, this mode encrypts the same
plaintext differently with different initialization vectors. In addition, the en-
cryption of each block depends on the preceding block and therefore, if the
order of the cipher text blocks is modified, the decryption will be impossible
and the recipient realizes the problem. Furthermore, if a transmission error
affects the encrypted block Ci, then only the blocks mi and mi+1 are assigned,
the other blocks will be determined correctly.
CBC has been the most commonly used mode of operation. Its main draw-
backs are that encryption is sequential (i.e., it cannot be parallelized), and that
the message must be padded to a multiple of the cipher block size. One way
to handle this last issue is through the method known as cipher text stealing.
Note that a one-bit change in a plaintext or IV affects all following cipher text
blocks.
Decrypting with the incorrect initialization vector causes the first block of
plaintext to be corrupted, but subsequent plaintext blocks will be correct. This
is because a plaintext block can be recovered from two adjacent blocks of cipher
text. As a consequence, decryption can be parallelized. Note that a one-bit
change on the cipher text causes complete corruption of the corresponding block
of plaintext, and inverts the corresponding bit in the following block of plaintext,
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(a) CBC encryption mode
(b) CBC decryption mode
Figure 1: CBC mode of operation
but the rest of the blocks remain intact.
3 Proof of chaos
In this section, the proof of chaos of the CBC mode of operation is detailed.
Modeling follows a same canvas than what has been done for hash functions [3,
10] or pseudorandom number generation [2].
Let us consider the CBC mode of operation with a keyed encryption function
εk : B
N → BN depending on a secret key k, N is the size for the block cipher,
and Dk : BN → BN is the associated decryption function, such that for any k,
εk ◦Dk is the identity function. We define the Cartesian product X = BN×SN,
where:
• B = {0, 1} is the set of Boolean values,
• SN = J0, 2N−1KN, the set of infinite sequences of natural integers bounded
by 2N − 1, or the set of infinite N-bits block messages,
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in such a way that X is constituted by couples of internal states of the mode of
operation together with sequences of block messages. Let us consider the initial
function:
i : SN −→ J0, 2N − 1K
(mi)i∈N 7−→ m0
that returns the first block of a (infinite) message, and the shift function:
σ : SN −→ SN
(m0,m1,m2, ...) 7−→ (m1,m2,m3, ...)
which removes the first block of a message. Let mj be the j-th bit of integer,
or block message, m ∈ J0, 2N − 1K expressed in the binary numeral system, and
when counting from the left. We define:
Ff : B
N × J0, 2N − 1K −→ BN
(x,m) 7−→ (xjmj + f(x)jmj)j=1..N
This function returns the inputted binary vector x, whose mj-th components
xmj have been replaced by f(x)mj , for all j = 1..N such that mj = 0. In case
where f is the vectorial negation, this function will correspond to one XOR
between the clair text and the previous encrypted state. So the CBC mode of
operation can be rewritten as the following dynamical system:{
X0 = (IV,m)
Xn+1 = (Ek ◦ Ff0 (i(Xn1 ), Xn2 ) , σ(Xn1 )) (1)
For any given g : J0, 2N−1K×BN −→ BN, we denoteGg(X) = (g(i(X1), X2);σ(X1))
(when g = Ek ◦Ff0 , we obtain one cypher block of the CBC, as depicted in Fig-
ure 1). So the recurrent relation of Eq.(1) can be rewritten in a condensed way,
as follows.
Xn+1 = GEk◦Ff0 (X
n) . (2)
With such a rewriting, one iterate of the discrete dynamical system above cor-
responds exactly to one cypher block in the CBC mode of operation. Note that
the second component of this system is a subshift of finite type, which is related
to the symbolic dynamical systems known for their relation with chaos [12].
We now define a distance on X as follows: d((x,m); (xˇ, mˇ)) = de(x, xˇ) +
dm(m, mˇ), where: 
de(x, xˇ) =
∑N
k=1 δ(xk, xˇk)
dm(m, mˇ) =
9
N
∞∑
k=1
∑N
i=1 |mi − mˇi|
10k
.
This distance has been introduced to satisfy the following requirements:
• The integral part between two points X,Y of the phase space X corre-
sponds to the number of binary components that are different between the
two internal states X1 and Y1.
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• The k-th digit in the decimal part of the distance between X and Y is
equal to 0 if and only if the k-th blocks of messages X2 and Y2 are equal.
This desire is at the origin of the normalization factor
9
N
.
We will now prove that,
Proposition 1 Gg is a continuous map on (X , d).
Proof Let us consider a sequence Xn of elements of X , which converges to Xˇ.
We denote by Xn = (xn,mn) and Xˇ = (xˇ, mˇ), so that (1) xn −→ xˇ and (2)
mn −→ mˇ.
Due to (1) and the definition of de, we have that ∃n0 ∈ N,∀n > n0, xn = xˇ,
while (2) and definition of dm imply that ∃n1 ∈ N,∀n > n1,mn0 = mˇ0. Let
ε > 0.
• If ε > 1, then for n > max(n0, n1),
d
(
Gg(X
n), Gg(Xˇ)
)
= d
(
(g(i(Xn0 ), X
n
1 );σ(X
n
0 )) ;
(
g(i(Xˇn0 ), Xˇ
n
1 );σ(Xˇ
n
0 )
))
= d ((g(i(mn), xn);σ(mn)) ; (g(i(mˇn), xˇn);σ(mˇn)))
= d ((g(mn0 , x
n);σ(mn)) ; (g(mˇn0 , xˇ
n);σ(mˇn)))
= d ((g(mˇn0 , xˇ
n);σ(mn)) ; (g(mˇn0 , xˇ
n);σ(mˇn)))
= de (g(mˇ0, xˇ); g(mˇ0, xˇ)) + dm(σ(m
n), σ(mˇ))
= dm(σ(m
n), σ(mˇ))
< 1 < ε.
• Else, there exists an integer k such that 10−k > ε > 10−(k+1). mn −→ mˇ,
so ∃n2 ∈ N,∀n > n2, dm(mn, mˇ) < 10−(k+2), i.e., for all terms larger than
n2, the k + 2-th first terms of m
n and mˇ are equal. So the k + 1-th first
terms of σ(mn) and σ(mˇ) are equal too, and thus dm (σ(m
n), σ(mˇn)) <
10−(k+1) < ε.
We thus have proven, using the sequential characterization of the continuity,
that Gg is continuous on (X , d).
Let us now recall that a directed graph is strongly connected when it contains
a directed path from u to v and a directed path from v to u for every pair of
vertices u, v. Then we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Let g = εk ◦ Ff0 , where εk is a given keyed block cipher and
f0 : B
N −→ BN, (x1, ..., xN) 7−→ (x1, ..., xN) is the Boolean vectorial negation.
We consider the directed graph Gg, where:
• vertices are all the N-bit words.
• there is an edge m ∈ J0, 2N − 1K from x to xˇ if and only if g(m,x) = xˇ.
So if Gg is strongly connected, then Gg is strongly transitive.
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Proof Let (x,m) and (xˇ, mˇ) be two elements of X , and ε > 0. We are look-
ing for n ∈ N and another point (x′,m′) close at ε from (x,m), such that
Gng ((x
′,m′)) = (xˇ, mˇ).
As ε may be < 1, we have necessarily x′ = x. Let us denote by n0 =
blog10(ε)c+ 1, and ∀j 6 n0, m′j = mj , in such a way that all the points (x′,m′)
having this form are ε-close to (x,m). Let X = Gn0g (x,m).
Gg being strongly connected, these exist n1 ∈ N and edges M0, ...,Mn1 ∈J0, 2N + 1K that realize a path between node X1 and xˇ. But the point
X ′ = (x; (m0,m1, ...,mn0 ,M0,M1, ...,Mn1 , mˇ0, mˇ1, ...)
is such that:
• X ′ is ε-close to (x,m),
• Gn0+n1g (X ′) = (xˇ, mˇ),
proving by doing so the strong transitivity of Gg on (X , d).
We will now prove that,
Proposition 3 If Gg is strongly connected, then Gg is regular.
Proof Let (x,m) ∈ X and ε > 0. We are looking for a point (x′,m′) that is
both periodic and ε-close to (x,m).
Let us define x′ = x, n0 = blog10(ε)c + 1, and ∀i 6 n0, m′i = mi. Consider
X = Gn0g (x,m). Gg being strongly connected, there exist edges M0, ...,Mn1 that
realize a path between X1 and x. Finally, the point defined by:
(x; (m0, ...,mn0 ,M0, ...,Mn1 ,m0, ...,mn0 ,M0, ..., ))
is:
• periodic,
• ε-close to (x,m).
Having found such a point in the neighborhood of (x,m), we thus can claim
that Gg is regular.
According to Propositions 2 and 3, we can conclude that,
Theorem 1 If the directed graph Gg is strongly connected, then the CBC mode
of operation is chaotic according to Devaney.
4 Case studies
This section is devoted to illustrations on how the above theorem can be applied
in practice. A few old school and insecure block ciphers are studied from the
standpoint of their dynamics, and chaos property is stated for most of them.
This latter is indeed inherited from the conjunction of 3 fundamental operations
who are often related to chaos, namely the shift operation, the bitwise exclusive
OR, and the vectorial negation [4].
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4.1 A few transposition ciphers
Let us give now two examples of block ciphers ε that have a strongly connected
directed graph Gε◦f0 , leading to a chaotic behavior for the CBC mode of oper-
ation. These two rudimentary examples are taken from so-called transposition
cipher methods.
4.1.1 A trivial but chaotic situation
Let us consider the trivial example where the inputted block cipher method
is the identity. This is the most rudimentary transposition cipher where the
cyphertext is equal to the plaintext. In that situation, we will show that the CBC
encryption mode has a chaotic behavior due to the shift and XOR operations.
Let Id : BN −→ BN, x 7−→ x the identity function, which will act as εk in
Figure 3(a). We consider g = Id ◦ Ff0 defined from BN × J0, 2N − 1K to BN,
and the graph Gg as defined in the previous section. We will show that this
directed graph is strongly connected, thus leading to a chaotic behavior of the
CBC mode of operation.
Lemma 1 The directed graph GId◦Ff0 is strongly connected.
Proof Let us consider two nodes x and xˇ. Let k be the number of differ-
ent bits in the N-bits binary decomposition of these two integers. We denote by
m1, ...,mk ∈ J1,NK the positions of these differences. So g(m1, g(m2, ..., g(mk, x)...)) =
xˇ, as when considering εk = Id, the effect of g(m,X) is to switch them-th binary
digit of X.
In other words, there is a path between x and xˇ, namely the one that follows
edges m1,m2, ..., and then mk. Hence, GId◦Ff0 is strongly connected.
According to above lemma and Theorem 1, we can thus conclude that,
Proposition 4 The CBC mode of encryption has a chaotic behavior when the
embedded block cipher is the identity.
This result may appear as surprising, but it only states that, even if we do
not operate any cipher operation at each internal state of the system, the xor
operation between the previous state and a new block of the message introduces
a sufficient amount of disorder to be unable to predict the future evolution of
the internal state. To say this differently, a modification of one block of message,
or of the IV, may possibly have effects on the outputted block that cannot be
predicted on a long term basis.
4.1.2 A second transposition cypher method
Let us now consider that the encryption function is the vectorial negation: εk =
f0. Remark that, again in that simple case, we do not consider any key k.
In that situation, the outputs have a chaotic dependence on the input: any
slightly modification on either the input vector or on one block message have
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effects on the output that cannot be predicted. This chaotic property is a direct
consequence of the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Suppose that N is even. So the directed graph Gf0◦Ff0 is strongly
connected.
Proof Let g = f0 ◦ Ff0 , so
g(m, (x1, ..., xN)) = f0((x1, ..., xm−1, xm, xm+1, ..., xN))
= (x1, ..., xm−1, xm, xm+1, ..., xN).
In other words, the effect of g on (m, (x1, ..., xN)) is to switch each bit in x =
(x1, ..., xN) (that is, to operate the binary negation), except on the m-th one.
In other words, in Gf0◦Ff0 , there is an edge labelled m between two nodes x1
and x2 if and only if only the m-th bit in their binary decomposition are equal
(all the other bits must be different).
Obviously, starting from x = (x1, ..., xm−1, xm, xm+1, ..., xN) and following
edges 2, 3, ..., N will switch each bit inside vector x an even number of times,
except for the first component, which is switched an odd number of times. So
the state that is recovered after such a path is (x1, ..., xm−1, xm, xm+1, ..., xN).
Similarly, when we start from x and we follow edges labeled by 1, 3, 4, ..., N,
then we arrive on a state having all the same component of x, except the second
one.
Given any couple (x, xˇ) of nodes in Gf0◦Ff0 , we can thus extract the position
m0,m1...,mk of the differences in their binary decomposition as in Proof 4.
Then, the path in this graph that starts by x and then following the edges:
• 1, 2, ..., N, except m0
• following by 1, 2, ..., N, except m1
• ...
• following by 1, 2, ..., N, except mk
arrives in xˇ, proving by doing so the strong connectivity of Gf0◦Ff0 .
The chaotic behavior of the CBC mode of operation can be deduced again
from the above lemma, in the case where εk = f0.
4.2 Caesar shift
We now consider one of the simplest and most widely known substitution cipher,
namely the Caesar shift. In this latter, each symbol in the plaintext is replaced
by a symbol some fixed number of positions down the given alphabet. Translated
in the N binary digits set of integers, this cypher can be written as follows:
Ek(x) : J0, 2N − 1K −→ J0, 2N − 1K
x 7−→ x+ k mod 2N ;
Dk(x) : J0, 2N − 1K −→ J0, 2N − 1K
x 7−→ x− k mod 2N
(3)
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(a) N = 2, k = 1 (b) N = 2, k = 2
Figure 2: Gg of some Caesar ciphers Ek(x) : J0, 2N−1K −→ J0, 2N−1K, x 7−→ x+k
mod 2N
x m Ff0(x,m) g(m,x) = Ek ◦ Ff0(x,m)
0 (0,0) 0 2 (1,0) 3
0 (0,0) 1 1 (0,1) 2
1 (0,1) 0 3 (1,1) 0
1 (0,1) 1 0 (0,0) 1
2 (1,0) 0 0 (0,0) 1
2 (1,0) 1 3 (1,1) 0
3 (1,1) 0 1 (0,1) 2
3 (1,1) 1 2 (1,0) 3
x m Ff0(x,m) g(m,x)
0 (0,0) 0 2 (1,0) 0
0 (0,0) 1 1 (0,1) 3
1 (0,1) 0 3 (1,1) 1
1 (0,1) 1 0 (0,0) 2
2 (1,0) 0 0 (0,0) 2
2 (1,0) 1 3 (1,1) 1
3 (1,1) 0 1 (0,1) 3
3 (1,1) 1 2 (1,0) 0
N = 2, k = 1 N = 2, k = 2
Table 1: g(x,m) for two shifts in Caesar cipher
where k is the shift value acting as secret key. We will now show through
examples that the CBC mode of operation embedding the Caesar shift can
behave either chaotically or not, depending on k and N.
Table 1 contains the g(x,m) values for a shift of 1 and 2 respectively, in
Caesar cipher over 2-bit blocks. In this table, we can see that, when a shift
of 2 value is operated in the Caesar based CBC, it is impossible to reach the
blocks (1,0) and (1,1) when starting from (0,0). This fact, which is illustrated in
Figure 2, leads to non chaotic behavior of the CBC mode of encryption, as the
graph Gg is not strongly connected. Conversely, this graph becomes strongly
connected when operating a shift of 1, as depicted in the same figure, leading
to a chaotic behavior of the mode of encryption.
Figure 3, for its part, presents the graph of iteration of the Caesar based
CBC mode of operation, with the same kind of shifts, but when operating on
blocks of size 3. We can verify that, at each time, the cipher block chaining
behaves chaotically. In that situation, we can guarantee that any error on
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the IV (starting state) or on the message to encrypt (edges to browse) may
potentially lead to a completely different list of visited states, that is, of a
completely different ciphertext.
5 Discussion
It has been proven in the previous section that some well chosen block ciphers
can lead to a chaotical behavior for the CBC mode of operation. Indeed, this
mode of operation can be seen as a discrete dynamical system (recurrent se-
quence), whose evolution can thus be studied using common tools taken from
the mathematical analysis. In particular, its dynamics can be deeply investi-
gated, both qualitatively and quantitatively, using the rigorous mathematical
topology field of research. A subfield of this discipline specifically focus on
complex dynamics, defining when such recurrent sequences have evolution over
time that cannot be easily understood, whose effects of a slight alteration of
the initial term of the sequence may potentially lead to unpredictable mid term
evolution, and so on.
This subfield, namely the mathematical theory of chaos, has known several
developments in various directions these last four decades. Being mature now,
this theory allows to measure the complexity of the dynamics by evaluating, for
instance, the expansivity, the sensibility, the entropy of the dynamical system,
or its ability to visit the whole space, to name a few [5]. These properties may
impact, for instance, the ability of the mode of operation to face side-channel
attacks, or to measure the stability of the mode operation against transmission
errors.
Devaney’s definition of chaos is one of the oldest formalization of such com-
plex dynamics, and a lot of new notions have been introduced since this first
approach of chaos. Similarly, the block ciphers investigated in the previous
section are out-of-date. Indeed, the interest of our work is not to provide a col-
lection of secure and complex CBCs, but to initiate a complementary approach
for studying such modes of operation. Our intention is to show how to model
such modes, and that it is possible to study the complexity of their dynam-
ics. Up-to-date block ciphers and modes of operation, together with topological
analyses using most recent developments in this field, need to be investigated,
while the interest of each topological property of complexity must be related to
desired objectives for each mode of operation. +
6 Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we proved that CBC mode of operation behaves as Devaney’s
topological chaos if the iteration function used is the vectorial Boolean negation.
We applied these results to proof the chaotic behaviour of the CBC mode of
operation. The vectorial Boolean negation function has been chosen here, but
the process remains general and other iterate functions g can be used. The sole
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condition is to prove that Gg satisfies the Devaney’s chaos property. Thereafter,
we have given some examples of keyed block ciphers, which can be used by the
CBC mode, and which can lead to a chaotic behavior for this mode seeing that
they have a strongly connected directed graph. These examples are taken from
so-called transposition cipher methods.
In future work, we will investigate other choices of keyed block ciphers. This
same canvas of our contribution will be explored to proof the chaotic behaviour
of the other modes of operation. We will treat the DES (Data encryption stan-
dard block) cipher algorithm so as to put in evidence his chaotic also behavior.
Doing theses contributions will allow us to enrich the block cipher algorithm’s
field.
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(a) N = 3, k = 1
(b) N = 3, k = 2
Figure 3: Gg of some Caesar ciphers Ek(x) : J0, 2N−1K −→ J0, 2N−1K, x 7−→ x+k
mod 2N
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